Improving Operator Performance

Research from the Center for Operator Performance Antoon Tuerlings, Yokogawa David Strobhar, Beville Engineering Mark Nixon, Emerson Tom Fiske, Yokogawa

٨	Time	Торіс
A	1000	Welcome – Yokogawa
	1015	COP Introduction
a	1030	Event Prediction & Mitigation – Mark Nixon
9		(Emerson)
	1115	Break
e	1130	Shadowbox
0	1215	Lunch
	1230	Student Projects (through lunch)
n	1300	Procedure Modularization
	1345	Break
А	1400	Overviews – Mark Nixon (Emerson)
u	1445	Alarm Rates
	1530	New Projects – Tom Fiske (Yokogawa)
а	1545	Conclusion
u		

Welcome



YOKOGAWA



CoP Speakers today



Dave Strobhar



Mark Nixon



Tom Fiske



Antoon Tuerlings

Who is the Center for Operator Performance?











Center for Operator Performance



An Industry-Academia Collaboration www.operatorperformance.org





We had questions -


- } How can I make expert operators faster?
- } Are alarm targets valid?
- Is it worth changing exist displays to current practices?
- How can I get operators the support information they need, when they need it?
- } How do I create a hierarchy?
- What does a good overview look like?
- Should I use a large monitor for the console operators?

So we banded together

- > Operating company driven
- } Shared risk
- Focus on enhancing the safety and environmental performance of plants
- } Open
- } Prevent "black-eye" that hurts entire industry



COP Vision



Research

Tools	Knowledge	Benchmarks
Decision Making Exercises	Expertise	Alarm I & II
Procedure Modules	Knowledge Management	Fatigue (Data Mining)
Display Content (Decision Mapping)	Color Use	Display Metrics
Event Prediction & Mitigation	Simulator Survey	Use of hand-held devices
Display Evaluation Toolkit	Training Methods	Large Screen
Overview Displays	Mental Models	Incident data mining
Student projects		
Decision Aids	Use of red for stop/closed and warning	Symbol Size
Large Monitor	Data Entry Devices	Emergent Features


Event Prediction IV Update

Michael Baldea/Mark Nixon November 19, 2014 Austin, TX




Project Overview

Goal: Develop visual data analysis and decision support tools EXPLICIT time IMPLICIT time




Task Progress to Date

} Concept: 3D Radial Plots




Fault detection: use operating envelope




Task Progress to Date

} Concept: 3D Radial Plots



- } Centroid representation
 - Every polygon can be represented by its centroid




Multiple polygons result in multiple centroids

Event Prediction IV 14.11.19


Centroid representation

- Function Structures Structures Structures Structures For Structures Struct
- For any given polygon, the centroid is defined as the average of all vertices in the polygon



For a near regular polygon, the center of gravity is close to the intersection of the bisectors

Multivariate Analysis




- A change in the process = distortion of polygon = movement of centroid
- Black and red lines
 represent the univariate
 operating envelope for
 each principal component
 / variable
- Ellipse represents the multivariate operating envelope for the steadystate data (blue)

Event Prediction IV 14.11.19


Visualization of Large Dataset

} Amenable to one scan – one point representation



Filtering of the Centroids

} In a 3D perspective the data is smoothened out in time.



Looking at Transitions – Motivation

- Only looked at faults deviating from a single steady state thus far
 - What about data containing multiple steady states?
 - How to account for process startup/restart (see previous example)?
 - What about batch processes (blending, reaction...)?
- > Dealing with process transitions can be difficult
 - Faults can be masked by transition dynamics and be difficult to detect




Looking at Transitions – Purpose of Transition Paths

- } Desire to find the "normal" process transition
 - Avoid and/or correct "poor" transitions

- Prevent operator error/disturbances/malfunction
- If a "good" transition path is known, then transitions that deviate from the path can be considered faulty
- Plant startup, shut down, and batch processes all contain transitions
 - Avoiding poor transitions is key to keeping plants online for longer


COP Projects

- } Individual compressor surge
- } Column flooding
- } Long-term compressor surge
- Flaring event analysis



Long-term Comp. Surge

- Given large compressor system dataset over 16 years
 - 1998-2014 in 2 hour samples
- Smaller datasets at a faster sample rate
 - Aug/14 and Sept/14 in 1 minute sample
 - Validate findings
 - August detect fault
 - September no fault TO detect (test for false positives)



 Build model using large dataset and attempt to use model to detect validate findings in the smaller datasets




Long-term Comp. Surge

ν.

Results:


- August fault successfully detected
 - Predicted at 11:48 AM
 - Vs: actual at 1:17 PM
- Top contributing tags 0
 - Second suction level
 - Second stage pressure -
 - Third stage suction temperature -
 - Third suction level
 - Discharge pressure
- No false positives raised in 0 the September dataset



Column Flooding

- Given monthly data of column
 operation
 - 4 months total (June-September)
 - 1 minute sample rate
 - 60+ variables
 - 75% variance captured on average using PCA

All 8 floods were predicted






Flaring Event Analysis

- > Data on a system with flares present
- > System properties
 - Multiple process units feeding into a main loop
 - Connected to a compressor that feeds into steam generator outside of the system
 - Flare tower burns off excess gas that the compressor cannot handle

24



Flaring Event Analysis

- A large dataset is provided for model building purposes
 - 1 year duration
 - 1 minute sample rate 500 thousand samples
 - 100+ variables
- } Try to predict and detect flare events in the year
 - Contains points 500 minutes before and after flare event occurrence
- > Project is underway




Future/Impact

- } Current Effort
 - Batch processing
 - Phase transition
 - Flaring
- } Goal
 - Package software for individual company testing
 - Create tool to work beside DCS
 - Integrate tool into DCS



Training for Improved Decision Making Gary Klein, Ph.D.



Efforts to Date

- > Nature of Expertise
- } Decision Making Exercises
- } Shadowbox I & II



Characteristics of Expertise	Crude Unit Operator	Fluid Catalytic Cracker	Pipeline Analyst
1. Form expectancies	Ö	Ö	Ö
2. Monitor cues	Ö	Ö	
3. Anticipate team member needs and limitations	Ö	Ö	Ö
4. Know where equipment and human resources can mislead you	Ö	Ö	Ö
5. Seek information to spot opportunities	Ö		Ö
6. Adapt the way they perform	Ö	Ö	Ö
7. Describe how events came about and will play out	Ö		Ö
8. Utilize time horizons			Ö
9. Use recall processes to overcome memory limitations	Ö	Ö	Ö
10. Construct mental simulations	Ö		Ö
11. Decenter			
12. Engage in deliberate practice	Ö	Ö	
13. More recognitional decisions than option comparisons	Ö	Ö	Ö

Decision Making Exercises (DMX)

- } Good decision making requires practice
- } Adapt military training exercises
- } Scenario based
- } Time pressure
- } Ambiguous
- } Low cost
- } Easy to apply (< 1 hour before shift)</pre>



Decision Making Exercises (DMX)

} Project

Adapted military training exercises to process control. Military use DMX to train platoon leaders to make faster and more accurate decisions during urban operations.

} Impact

Proved to be low-cost and easy to apply method to enhance decision making.

 One-hour periodically at beginning of shift

- Identified skill/knowledge gaps
- Identified lost practices
- Helps build mental model



Scenario phase 1

Background

It's late spring and the weather for the last few weeks from the South to the Mid-West has been volatile, with several major thunderstorms moving along the Mississippi River. One of these storms knocked out power to a pump station just last week.

Today one of the lines on your console you'll be working is the Beaumont to Creal Springs Line. The Beaumont-Creal Springs 24"- 26" Products Line is 644 miles long. There are six booster stations on this line: Beaumont (BEAU), Sugartown (SUGT), Kilbourne (KILB), Tutwiler (TUTW), Fisherville (FISH), and Obion (OBIN). It also has a Pump Matrix, giving you information on optimal unit combinations and start/stop sequences.

(The Hydraulic Gradient Screen 1 provided should give you a picture of this line's current status.)

Shift change reveals nothing unusual going on with this line.

You spend some time checking your other lines and making sure that everything's on schedule. You're having a busier morning than usual as you spend a couple of hours just "fighting fires" and trying to stay ahead of the problems.

At 1030, SUGT calls you and says they need to do some pump maintenance and need you to shut down the unit for about 20 minutes.

Requirement: You have two minutes. What is your plan for supporting the SUGT maintenance?

- A. What do you think is going on here? / What are your biggest concerns right now? (elicit their situation assessment)
- B. What are the difficult decisions? (elicit decisions)
- C. What things are you paying attention to to figure out what's going on? (elicit cues/factors)
- D. What are the potential courses of action you could take right now? (elicit COAs and their COA analysis)
- E. Which one would you follow? Why?

Shadowbox Technique

- } Method
 - Present complex scenarios
 - Insert Decision Points with a small set of options
 - Trainees record their responses and their rationale under time limits/stress
 - Trainees compare responses and rationale to a panel of SMEs
 - Trainees identify what the SMEs were seeing and thinking that they (the trainees) were not



Portion of Scenario

Scenario Continues...

12:00 PM – Screen Shot #3

The heart of the cold front and thunderstorm has arrived, and you are getting considerable amounts of rain and lightning. Because of this, you decide to cease the ongoing tasks. You pull the outside operators from dumping caustic, and ask the operators withdrawing the catalysts to hold off until the rain and lightning pass.

You are also experiencing alarms in the Gas Con unit. The cold air and rain is affecting the amount of condensing within the units.

Additionally, you begin to receive multiple alarms on the FCC Feed page. For unknown reasons the Heater Outlet temperature seems to be dropping. The Burner Tip Pressure has begun to increase.

* Please use your ShadowBox to record important information.

Now proceed to Decisions 2 and 3 on the following pages.

ShadowBox Illustration

Decision 2:

What cues are you monitoring most closely at this moment? Rank these options (1 = most important, 4 = least important). Please explain your rankings.

Rank	Options A) The heater – watching the fuel gas pressure. B) Temperatures in the Gas Con unit – avoiding low alarms and checking fans. 	
	D) LPR condensing + Flare KO pot levels.	

Explain rationale for your top three rankings:

Pilot Results – Refinery FCC

Scenario	Expert	Novice
#1	88%	80%
#2	88%	70%



Variations


- > Variety of response
 - Prioritize information to remember
 - Prioritize goals
 - Prioritize actions
 - Anticipatory actions
 - Desired information
 - Cues via video clips
- } Presentation
 - Paper & Pencil
 - Tablet
 - PC

Future/Impact


- > DMX Impact
 - Enable detection of mental models to focus training
 - Aided in training of new engineers
 - Useful in sharing lessons of events
- } Shadowbox
 - Test scalability, is it useful beyond unit for which it was created
 - If true, then create
 - library of exercises for COP members
 - training program to allow members to design their own



Student Projects Decision Aids Large Screen Impact



A Typical Manifold




Job Aids

- } No job aid
- } Manifold diagram
- } Line demarcation
- } Checklist

} Combinations of the individual job aids



Job Aids






Valve 19 open CLOSE Valve 18 Valve 17 CLOSE CLOSE Valve 16 CLOSE Valve 15 Valve 10 open Valve 23 open CLOSE Valve 11 CLOSE Valve 12 CLOSE Valve 13 CLOSE Valve 14 CLOSE Valve 22



Training Checklist

Hydrocracker to Tank 43 and Tank 16 to Truck Rack

Tank 11 and Tank 15



Procedure

3 24 subjects


} 1st visit

- Training
- 3 different tasks
- Questionnaire
- } 2nd visit (1 week later)
 - 3 different tasks
 - Questionnaire
- } Received IRB approval






Accuracy



Time



Task Time

Extended Operator Workplace





Scope

- } Compare reaction times:
 - Information on large 52'' monitor
 - 12 feet away
 - Information on small nearby monitor
 - 2 feet away




Design of the experiment

- } "Information" and "Control" screens
- } Changing numbers on information screen
- } Control arrows on control screen
- Operator must make change on control screen to keep values within range




Nearby Information Screen




Distant Information Screen



Operator Information Screen




Operator Control Screen



JMP ANOVA Analysis

- } Average response times
 - Nearby = 4.30 seconds
 - Distant = 4.64 seconds
- For the starget is marginally significant

• p = 0.08



Longest response time in sections 1 and 9


Situation Awareness (Overview) Displays



Overview Example Review



This is really a Unit Control Display



This is really a Unit Control Display

KEY DECISONS.

The display appears to support key decisions

STRUCTURE

The display is reasonably well organized with œ crouped information

DISPLAY HERACHY Nevigation is well structured. 1-clicks to any L2 clipplay and 2-clicks to any L3 display

CONVENTIONS AND COUING Consistent coding and color conventions

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS Ο Claplays doesn't seem to provide much support for the operator in determining if the process is running on target. The display includes KPIs.

> QUANTITATIVE VS QUALITATIVE Most values appear to be quantitative

RECOMMENDATIONS: Indicate good versus bad Place trends to show patterns -Place display elements to show patients -Convert some of value to qualitative -Some equipment mixeling

KEY DECISONS The display appears to support key decisions.

The display is reconneably well or particul with grouped information. Lacks diesures,

DISPLAY HIERACHY Manipation is unclear.

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CONVENTION'S AND CODING. Excessive use of spice and errors,


SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

Displays doesn't seem to provide much support for the operator in determining if the process is turning co-target

QUANTITATIVE VS QUALITATIVE

Most values appear to be quantitative **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

Indicate good versus bad Flace trends to above patterns Hace clocksy elements to show patterns. -Convert spinse of variate to speakfalling



0 Not sure obsther/hear the display supports key decisions STRUCTURE

0

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С

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The display is reasonably well organized with grouped information (4 trend lines per trend)

UISPLAY HILRACHY

REY DECISIONS.

Not clear what the bianarchy is? Nev igstion included at the top of the acreents.

CONVENTIONS AND CODING.

Displays follow consistent coding and color usages. Some concern about using red for frend 121612044

STEUATIONAL AWASSINESS. Can't full of the equipment is operating within

range. What does the this mean? What are the process time constants? Are trend times correct?

QUANTITATIVE VS QUALITATIVE œ Most values appear are qualitative

RECOMMENDATIONS indicate good versus bad -Pherae display elsements to show patients

Convert some of value to quantitative

The clackay is reasonably well organized with grouped information

DISPLAY HIERACHY

Navigation is unclear.

CONVENTIONS AND CODING

Displays follow coding and color conventions

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Displays provides considerable support for the operator in determining if the process is running Negrat-no

QUANTITATIVE VS QUALITATIVE All values appear to be qualitative.

RECOMMENDATIONS Place trends to show natients

Overview Display (201206) Final Presentation 2014-11-18

This is a form of an Overview Display

-- ----- - - - -.......... . 1 And the state of the local state

4 Seconds


- Enable the operator to determine the health of the units under their span of responsibility
- If a problem exists, directs them to displays from which they can troubleshoot and correct the problem.
- } Do this by:
 - Present the correct data, well formatted to answer the operator questions:
 - "Is my process ok?" and, "Is it running at the desired target?"
 - As the questions are qualitative in nature, the information should generally be presented in a qualitative manner.

Quantitative vs Qualitative

		Time to Assess Experiment (seconds)		
		Quantitative Question	Qualitative Question	
PV 78.5 PCT SP 78.0 PCT OP 62 MANUAL	Quantitative Presentation (less abstract)	102	115	
	Qualitative Presentation (more abstract)	118	101	
		How full is the tank?	Am I runnin at the setpo and will it st there?	

How Should The Information Be Organized?


- Creates a carefully organized system of displays
 - Navigate directly to primary operating display, and to detail where needed.
 - Display organized by function
 - Typically less than 100 PV's on the display
- Just for this operator position
- No more than 10 sections on an overview display



An Overview


Supports Operator's key decisions

- "Is my domain OK?"
- "Is it operating at the desired target?"
- 4-second situational awareness
- Overview Display is always visible



- Display organized by function
- Utilizes qualitative information
- Typically less than 100 parameters on the overview





Steps to Design Overview Displays



Content

- Do I need every single data point?
- What data points are important?
- What data should be fused into information?

Organization

- What information is needed for high level situation awareness?
- How do I choose the information for overviews down to details?
- What information should be grouped together?
- Which sets of information should be grouped across screens?

Format

- What is the best frame of reference?
- What is the best way to move across screens and into details?
- What colors should be used?
- What sizes of font, lines, etc...


Content


What Data Should Be Included In A Display?

- } Decision Mapping
- } Interviewing
- Facilitation Process
- } Key Leading Indicators of changes in the Process
- } Story telling



How Should The Information Be Formatted?





Presentation 2014-11-18

Future/Impact


- } Impact
 - Overview created for project
 - Positive feedback has led to creation for 11 other consoles in control room
- Future
 - Team moved on to lower levels
 - Creating representation options for key equipment (reactors, heaters)
 - Developing rules for display system creation



Procedure Modularization

Sandeep Purao Penn State University





Procedure Assessment

- } Issues
 - Same steps in multiple procedures
 - Different levels/types of information (task versus training)
 - Different users
 - One size fits all
- } Improvement option
 - Break procedures into chunks that can be recombined
- } Problems
 - Volume
 - Style/format

Development procedure

STANDING INSTRUCTION NO. DGHE-8


LOSS OF HYDROGEN RECYCLE COMPRESSORS

Feed control valves will close, MA-14 and GH-376 will shut down. Check to see if this has happened.

Shut off makeup hydrogen. Shut down compressor GH-572 if in service. Close feed control block Valve. Also close liquid recycle valve if recycling product. Fuel gas control valve will close, steam to heater will open.

Start venting plant to H.P. fuel via recycle drip vessel 1252. Notify Cracking. Start N₂ to plant via suction bottle on compressor GH-504 (open bypass) when plant pressure is 160 psi, close vent to fuel on V-1252 open to flare via LPG Drip 1257. (Close Suction on Com-

Application of Heuristics



Conjuncti	Continue str Shut off hyd Stop the con Close in lea	ed value to platto oduct separato wit culating hydrogen ipper bottoms circ rogen to compresso densate injection n and fat DEA circ e vent gas compres	h norm until ulation rs 503 and so ulation	al operating reactor temper n through hear and 504. Swin ur water pump	ter 35 tch mak	until r	adiant
	Proced	ure	Action	Target	Step-Break	Conjunctio	Condition
Cont	inue circulating hydrog	en until reactor tempera	continue	hydrogen	TRUE	until	temperature
Shut	down compressors 503	and 504.	shutdow	compressors 503	TRUE		
Vent	system to flare if nece	ssary.	vent	system	2		
Procedure C	hunking 🔤	irculation through heate	continue	striper bottom		until	temperature

Procedure Elements for Chunking

Procedures: DDHE 10-DS.txt

File:	DDHE	10-DS.bd	
1			

	 Break-Int		Lines of	Subject	Subject	Predicate	Adverbial	Object	Object M	Purpose	Condition	Conjuncti.
	 	1	Cooling w	field		Cooling		water fail				
		2	Close anni	field		Close		annin value	in the fee			and
		4	Shut dow			Shut down	-	the field f	and the second se			anu
	 	5	Throw swi		-	Throw			on DHT e	to shut He		-
	 -	6	Open Delu			Open			to HDU an	to shut netti		
	 	7	Shut dow	and the second se	-	Shut down			at emerge			
	 -	8	Block off t			Block off	-		to make H		if operatin	
0			BIOCK OIT LIL	inclu		BIOCK OII			to make ma		in operation	
		9	Manually	field		Manually		unload co		-		
		10	Shut dow			Shut down		Heater 30				
	 	11	Start stea			Start		steam	to Htr .29			
		12	Open dam			Open		dampers			0	
		13	Close mai			Close		main block	on fuel an			
13		14	Vent unit t		1			5	Ventunitto		9	
		15	Close in w			Close in	1	warm an	with norm			
		16	Close in le	field		Close in		lean and	1			
		17	Notify the	field	12	Notify		the SRU			- S	
		18	Stop cond			Stop		condensa				
		19	Pump only	field		Pump		1	onlyenoug		as to avoi	
		20	Watch pu	field		Watch		pump be	temperature			
		21	Close strip	field		Close		steam			if open	
		22	Vent strip	field		Vent		stripper	to flaretoc			
		23	As time p								As	
	 -	24	Stop feed		(c)	Stop		feed and				
		25	Unload co			Unload		compress				
	-	26	Purge syst	1.		Purge		And the second sec	with hydro		if availabl	
		27	If unable t	field		notify		Process			If unable t	

Test – 40 pages of Emergency Procedures

Procedure: D-900-07.05	07 - Emergency Operations	Operations	
Revision: 0		Zone D	
Effective Date: 11-Sep-2009	Laurel Refinery	900 - ULSD	

PURPOSE

Loss of Power

SCOPE

This procedure details the steps needed to safely respond in the event of a power loss

PROCEDURE							
Role	Description of Task						
	total	following procedure details the steps needed to safely respond in the even loss of power. It is a requirement of operation personnel to have in depth erstanding of ESD procedures prior to operating the plant					
co	1.	Trip the Reactor Charge Heater Emergency Shutdown System, (I-904) HZ-9056 A.					
		 Closes Reactor Charge Heater Fuel Gas Emergency Shut-off Valve, fuel gas control valves and shuts down Charge Pump P-901 A/B. 	1				
ZN	2.	Block in the Reactor Charge Heater H-901 fuel gas control valve FV-9028 A/B and burner block valves					
со	3.	Trip the emergency fuel gas shut down system for the Fractionator Reboiler with (I-914) HZ-9441A.					
		 Closes Fractionator Reboiler Fuel Gas Emergency Shut-off Valve XV-9508A and fuel gas control valve FV-9425. 					

Results – 4 Pages of Unique Actions

#	Chunk		Steps
1	Clear exchanger tubes		2
2	Shutdown Unit		2
3	Isolate frac		4
4	Make Notifications		4
5	Total Reflux		1
6	Secure Heaters		3
7	Trip Charge Heater		2
8	Total Recycle		3
9	Troubleshoot Cause		3
10	Line-up to offspec		4
11	Secure Amine and H2		4
12	Bottle in 900 unit		13
13	Charge Heater ESD		10
14	Conserve H2		32
15	Depressure unit		7
16	Event Follow-up		15
17	Frac Reboil Heater ESD		9
18	Isolate Feed Rundown		8
19	Low H2 operation		8
20	Prevent Runaway		14
21	Secure 900 Unit		18
22	Shutdown Charge		4
		Total	170


PENNSTATE

College of Information Sciences and Technology

Procedure Splitter Ver. 0.7

	Lines of Procedure	Subject	Predicat	te		Object	Condition	Ot	Functiona	lity
0 pl	H UPSET TO 5.0 1 .	pH						-		2
1 5	top acid feed .		Stop	acid	feed				 Able to Modi 	6 .
3 In	crease blowdown to the maximum .		Increase	blow	vdown	8.30	100		Entries	Ly
5 W	/hen pH reaches normal range , increase chromate -L	3	increase	chro	omate (M	lalco) injection	When pH .	to	Enurep	
7 TI	he pH will gradually rise with the increased addition of	The pH		1.00			1			Proc-Split
8 D	o not let the pH rise above the normal control limit .		Do not le	t the	pH rise					
9 0	ince the pH has come within range , resume acid feed		resume	acid	feed		Once pH	-		Version 0.
a	nd									version 0.
C	ontrol closely in the recommended range .		control					-		
) pi	H UPSET BELOW 4.0 1 .									
	top acid feed .		Stop	acid	feed				1	
	ncrease blowdown to the maximum .		Increase		vdown				Phase 2 💌	
	/hen pH reaches normal range , increase chromate -L		increase	chro	omate (N	lalco) injection	When pH .	to		
	llow the ph to rise to 6.0 on its own accord		Allow	the	ph to ris	e		to	Save Current Out	put
	t which time			8					Save current out	put
	nitiate the acid feed								Confirm Changes	
	lold the pH between 6.7 and 7.0 for 24 hours		Hold	the	рН			be	confirm changes	
	hereupon							-		
	1								v 0.4	panalassias Santa
		-		_						
File	: DPE-9.txt									
#	Lines of Procedure		1	RIGG	Time	Location	1	Actor	Co-occurrence	Functionality
				RIGG	Time	Location		Actor	Co-occurrence	Functionality
10	Failure of boiler feed water pumps .	ed to plar	5		Time	Location Boiler Room #1	Field 0			A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR O
10	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe		t by cl		Time	Boiler Room #1		Operator	r	• Able to Modify
10 11 12	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu		t by cl		Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field 0	Operator Operator	r r	A CONTRACTOR OF A CONTRACTOR O
10 11 12 13	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26.	el gas to H	t by cl Teater		Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field C Field C	Operator Operator Operator	r r	Able to Modify
10 11 12 13 14	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26 . As time permits close a block valve on the main fuel ga	el gas to H	t by cl Teater		Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field C Field C Field C	Operator Operator Operator Operator		Able to Modify
10 11 12 13 14 15	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26 . As time permits close a block valve on the main fuel ga DHT operator will close the make hydrogen to HDU an	el gas to H Is and pilo d DHT .	t by cl Heater ht head	START	Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field C Field C Field C	Operator Operator Operator		Able to Modify
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26 . As time permits close a block valve on the main fuel ga DHT operator will close the make hydrogen to HDU an Unload make valves in compressors 503 , 504 , 510 at	el gas to H Is and pilo d DHT .	t by cl Heater ht head		Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field C Field C Field C DHT C	Operator Operator Operator Operator Operator		Able to Modify Entries
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26 . As time permits close a block valve on the main fuel ga DHT operator will close the make hydrogen to HDU an Unload make valves in compressors 503 , 504 , 510 at Pressure all liquid from product separator to stabilizer	el gas to H Is and pilo d DHT .	t by cl Heater of head §	START	Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field C Field C Field C DHT C	Operator Operator Operator Operator		Able to Modify
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26. As time permits close a block valve on the main fuel ga DHT operator will close the make hydrogen to HDU an Unload make valves in compressors 503 , 504 , 510 at Pressure all liquid from product separator to stabilizer Reduce stabilizer pressure if necessary. As recycle gas gravity increases , lower 501 compress Shut down TCE and H2O injection . Shut down # 4 feed booster pump .	el gas to H Is and pilo d DHT . nd 511 . or speed t	t by cl leater ot head s lo avoi s	START START START	Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field (Field (DHT C Field (Field (Field (Operator Operator Operator Operator Operator Operator		Able to Modify Entries Phase 3 Save Current Output
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Failure of boiler feed water pumps . Throw switch SW-612 at emergency panel to shut off fe Throw switch SS-337 at emergency panel to shut off fu Start steam to fire boxes on Heaters # 25 & 26. As time permits close a block valve on the main fuel ga DHT operator will close the make hydrogen to HDU an Unload make valves in compressors 503 , 504 , 510 at Pressure all liquid from product separator to stabilizer Reduce stabilizer pressure if necessary. As recycle gas gravity increases , lower 501 compress Shut down TCE and H2O injection . Shut down # 4 feed booster pump .	el gas to H Is and pilo d DHT . nd 511 . or speed t	t by cl leater ot head s lo avoi s	START START START	Time	Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1 Boiler Room #1	Field (Field C Field C DHT C Field C Field C	Operator Operator Operator Operator Operator Operator		Able to Modify Entries Phase 3 Save Current Output

Automated Procedure Chunking



Future/Impact

- Future
 - Creating integrated analysis & database software
 - Add ability to utilize/insert standard descriptors
 - Enable lookup tables to replace instrument numbers for redundant equipment (e.g., heaters)



Alarm Rate Analysis

Craig Harvey, Ph.D. Louisiana State University



Alarm Rate Standards

EEMUA Alarm Rate Standard

Long Term Average Alarm Rate in Steady Operation	Acceptability		
>1 alarm per minute	Very likely to be unacceptable		
1 alarm per two minute	Likely to be excessively demanding		
1 alarm per five minutes	Manageable		
<1 one alarm per ten minutes	Very likely to be acceptable		


ISA Alarm Rate Targets

Very Likely to be Acceptable

- ~150 Alarms per day
- ~6 Alarms per hour (average)
- ~1 Alarms per 10 minutes (average)

Maximum Manageable

- ~300 Alarms per day
- ~12 Alarms per hour (average)
- ~2 Alarms per 10 minutes (average)




Categorical Alarm Display

Description	Event Time 👛 🖉
LEAK IN RIGHTNE STATION 4	10:39:40 AM 7/2/2010 Page .
LEAK IN RIGLINE STATION 2	10:39:48 AM 7/2:2010 .up
LEAK IN RIGLINE STATION 10	10:39:10 AM 7/2/2010
I FAK IN PLATFORM LINE STATION 3	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010
LEAK IN PLATFORM LINE STATION 8	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010
I FAK IN PLATFORM FINE TANKFARM 1.1	10:39:40 AM 7/2:2010
	2
Description	Event Time 📃
PLATFORM LINE DEHYDRATOR AT PUMP 62, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010
PLATFORM LINE STATION 3 AT PUNP 7, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010 - Loop -
RIG LINE STATION 4 AT PUMP 36, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010
RIG LINE STATION 6 AT PUMP 41. "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010 - age to
RIC LINE STATION 8 AT PUMP 46, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010
PLATFORM LINE STATION 2 AT PUNP 5, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2/2010
PLATFORM LINE STATION 7 AT PUNP 17, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:48 AM 7/2:2010
PLATFORM LINE STATION 1 AT PUMP 2, "POWER TRIP".	10:39:40 AM 7/2/2010
	<u> </u>
Discovered on	Evert Time
	10 (9:40 AM 7/2/2010
	17.39.48 / M. 7/5/2011
	10 39:48 AM 7/2/2010
	10.79/40 AM 7/2/2010
	1. 5.348 AM 7/2/2012
	11,7940 AM 7/2/2017
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1. 23.48 AM 7/2/2011
	2
	Olinck
<u>AĽÁŔM</u>	0 01:00:3
	0 0 1.00.0
	LEAK IN REGLINE STATION 10 LEAK IN PLATFORM LINE STATION 3 LEAK IN PLATFORM LINE STATION 8 LEAK IN PLATFORM LINE STATION 8 LEAK IN PLATFORM LINE STATION 8 PLATFORM LINE STATION AT PUMP 62, "POWER TRIP". PLATFORM LINE STATION 3 AT PUMP 62, "POWER TRIP". RIG LINE STATION 4 AT PUMP 36, "POWER TRIP". RIG LINE STATION 4 AT PUMP 36, "POWER TRIP". RIG LINE STATION 6 AT PUMP 41, "POWER TRIP". RIG LINE STATION 6 AT PUMP 46, "POWER TRIP". PLATFORM LINE STATION 7 AT PUMP 5, "POWER TRIP". PLATFORM LINE STATION 7 AT PUMP 5, "POWER TRIP". PLATFORM LINE STATION 7 AT PUMP 5, "POWER TRIP". PLATFORM LINE STATION 7 AT PUMP 7, "POWER TRIP. PLATFORM LINE STATION 7 AT PUMP 7, "POWER TRIP. PLAT

Chronological Alarm Display

Through the	F. eacription	Event Time 🗹	= ս գլու եր,
11:00:24 AM 772/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION 2 AT PUMP 5 "DYPAGS VALVE VALPUNCTION	11:00 31 AM 7/2/2010	- 1 fti : it:
10:50:10 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATION 1 AT PUMP 29, "POWER TRIP".	10:50:10 AM 7/2/2010	Up
10:57:40 AM 7/2/2010	PLATFORM LINE STATION 10 AT PUNP 25, "POWER TRIP".	10:57:40 AM 7/2/2010	P
10:57:04 AM 772/2010	RIG LINE STATION SIAT PUMP 49, "EMPASS VALME MALFUNCTION".	10:57 C1 AM 7/2/2010	
10:56:50 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATION 4 AT PUMP 05, 10 BOHARGE VALVE MALTUNCTION'.	10:00 16 AM 7/2/2010	
10:56:50 AM 7/2/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION 10 AT FUMP 25, "SUCTION VALVE MALFUNCTION".	10:00 C0 AM 7/2/2010	
10:56:00 AM 772/2010	RIG LINE DELIYORATOR AT FUMP 60 "DISCLARGE VALVE MALFUNCTION".	10:96 C0 AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:20 AM 772/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION 2 AT PUMP 5 "SUCTION VALVE MALFUNCTION".	10:00 25 AM 7/2/2010	
10:56:21 AM 7/2/2010	LEAK IN RIGLINE STATION 4	10:56:21 AM 7/2/2010	
10:56:03 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATION 1 AT PUMP 20, "POWER TRIP".	10:56:03 AM 7/2/2010	
10:55:05 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATION 4 AT PUMP 07, "SUCTION MALVE MALTUNCTION".	10:60 09 AM 7/2/2010	
10:54:14 AM 772/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION C AT PUMP 14, "SUCTION VALVE MALFUNCTION"	10:54 11 AM 7/2/2010	- Duwn
10:54:0E 4M 7/2/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION C AT PUMP 15, 10 BCHARGE MALVE MALTUKOTION"	10:54 00 AM 7/2/2010	Fage Dow
10:54:00 AM 7/2/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION C AT PUMP 20, 10 BCHARGE MALVE MALTUNCTION"	10:54 00 AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:50 AM 7/2/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATION CIAT PUMPIC, "EMFASS VALME MALTUNCTION".	10:50 00 AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:40 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATION SIAT PUMP 47, "SUCTION VALVE MALTUNCTION".	10:50 40 AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:36 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATIONS AT PUMP 49, "EUCTION VALVE MALTUNCTION".	10:50 20 AM 7/2/2010	
10:53:03 AM 7/2/2010	PLATFORM LINE STATION 2 AT PUMP 5. "POWER TRIP".	10:53:03 AM 7/2/2010	
10:52:09 AM 7/2/2010	PLATFORM LINE STATION 1 AT PUMP 2. "POWER TRIP".	10:52:09 AM 7/2/2010	
10:51: 7 AM 772/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATIC VS AT PUMP 22, "EMPASS VALVE MALTURGTION".	10:51 17 AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:57 AM 772/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATIC VERATION PUMP 1. "DISCHARGE VALVE MALFUNCTION".	10:50 57 AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:51 AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE STATION CIAT PUMP 45, "EUCTION VALVE MALTUNCTION".	10:50 CT AM 7/2/2010	
10:50:11 AM 772/2010	RIG LINE STATIC VC AT PUMP 09, "SUCTION VALVE MALTUKCTION".	10:50 41 AM 7/2/2010	
10:19:16 AM 772/2010	RIG LINE STATION 4 AT PUMP 26, "EMPASS VALVE MALPUNCTION".	10:45/46/AM 7/2/2010	
10:19: C AM 7/2/2010	RIG LINE TANKTARM 2.1 AT PUMP 56, "SUCTION VALVE MALFUNCTION"	10:45 10 AM 7/2/2010	
10:19: E AM 7/2/2010	FLATFORM LINE STATIONS AT PUMPINE, 'D BOHARGE VALVE MALTUNGTION'	10:45 16 AM 7/2/2010	
		E I	
		_	
larm Crintinis		<u>Elinek</u>	
	ALARM	0.00.1	A - A C
vek Seler ind – Ark Dis	s ayr d - Ask Al I	0 00:14	4.48




Overview

- Minimum of 30 operators will run the experiment.
- Two kinds of alarm display's will be used (Chronological and Categorical).
- All treatment simulations are 1 hour and the alarm rates used as below:

Alarms/10 minutes	Chronological	Categorical
15	х	
20	Х	Х
25	Х	Х
30		Х

Response Time by Alarm Rate





RT – Alarm Rates v. Student/Operator

Level				Least Sq Mean (sec)
Student,20	Α			93.016354
Operator,20		В		47.676607
Student,10		В		31.785469
Operator,10		В		24.217462

- Students and Operators reaction time for solving an alarm can not be distinguished from one another except at the alarm rate of 20 alarms per 10 minutes
 - Students performed significantly slower than operators at 20 alarms per 10 minutes



Future/Impact

- } Impact
 - Published alarm targets are at best for novice operators
- } Future
 - Examining smart alarming
 - How to develop and document
 - Quantify benefits of alarm management
 - Does alarm management improve performance?
 - Current adoption is article of faith
 - Look at in conjunction with procedure automation



New COP Projects



Background Color

Business case:

Background color and color contrast is a very effective technique for presenting information to operators. The use of appropriate color schemes allows operators to very rapidly recognize and interpret information on the display.

Purpose:


Determine which variables have the greatest affect in selecting the background / foreground color palette for a given ambient light source?


What characteristics, aspects or principles of ambient lighting conditions influence the usability of sets of color on an operator display?


What characteristics, aspects or principles of the display device (screen, monitor, LCD panel) influence the usability of sets of color on an operator display? (examples include viewing angle, contrast ratio, brightness, glare, and treatments.)

How can these findings provide a starting point when considering other situations like uncontrolled environments outside the central control room? Standard office, roving operator in sunlight and shadow, airport gate lounge, etc.









Large Screen Display Survey

Purpose:

A survey of both member and non-member companies is being conducted to determine how large screens are or are not being effectively used in the petrochemical industry and the reason why.

In addition to size and number of monitors, the survey elicits input on the intent of the monitors, the formatting of the data, and suggestions for use.

The survey has sections for supervisors, operators, engineers, and designers.

This survey is open to any operating company, with results provided to all who participate.

The survey is on the ABB and COP websites.

As of March 13, 2015 about 60 responses have been received.

Factors:

Location, role of user, utilization, effectiveness, display format, etc.

Deliverable:

The survey results will be analyzed to identify current best practices and lessons learned, and will set the groundwork for future research to develop large **display** standards.

•		11 1
	Consideration Conside	
	*25. How frequently were the large displays originally intended to be used? Very sery Occes a site Contensuly	89

Optimal Workstation

Purpose:

Control rooms are sized to accommodate the console operator's workstation. The console operator's workstation has evolved with more information being presented. Where once only three, 15" monitors were present per operator now six or more might be provided along with additional monitors for the business network.

The reduced cost of monitors has resulted in far more of them, with potentially negative consequences. Not only are the excess monitors not adding value, they occupy valuable real estate. This project seeks to answer:

- What is the optimal design for an operating console?
- What factors influence the design
- How does the console design interact with the structure of the display system?

Deliverable:

Part of the deliverable will be to define from an analytic perspective the optimal operator workspace. The results will include the optimal number, size, and layout of the console workstations, with the basis of the layout. The analysis will account for differences in display system structures (i.e., linear versus hierarchical) for similar systems.



Procedure Warnings

Purpose:

Health, Environment and Safety (HES) and informational statements in operating or maintenance procedures are used to draw the operator's attention to any consequences of hazard exposure as a potential result of performing a procedural step and provide instruction(s) to avoid the hazard.

Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus regarding HES and informational statement representation within procedures. Additionally, there are human performance concerns regarding distracting template formats.

How can warning information be displayed such that such that operators globally can quickly identify, process, and comply with this information and perform the procedure safely without incident?

Is symbol with text best? Which symbols? What is the optimum placement of each? What is the importance of signal words? What the best color to use?

Deliverable:

Recommendations of symbols, choice of signal words, color formats for symbols, text placement, format of information presentation (levels) within HES and informational statements, color formats for other information and operator/technician training methods.



Handheld Usage

Background:

One of the fastest growing trends in the automation industry is the use of mobile devices. They are significantly changing the way users communicate, collaborate, obtain information, and interface with equipment. Mobile devices have opened up a wide range of applications possibilities, yet companies are struggling to take advantage of their full potential in operations.

Purpose:

The focus of the project is to determine guidelines on how to apply mobile technology based on operator tasks to save time, improve maintenance and prevent accidents. The project will identify important variables to increase the effectiveness of information presented and displayed to operators in situations where mobile devices can support and enhance human decision making.

It will also show how can text aware computing factors, sensor information, and input modalities be combined to provide an intuitive human computer interaction in the context of field operators in the process industry?

Deliverable:

Identification of important variant and invariant attributes that affect handheld displays information presentation. The development of display design policy and guidelines / recommendations for the graphic design targeted on a sub-handheld devices



Why should I get involved

- Get to direct research COP is member driven(driven by Champions members)
- > No time requirement (limited as you desire)
- 3 Share costs/risk (with active project managements direction)
- Research tailored to your site/problems (driven by operator taken at your site)



Who is the Center for Operator Performance?











Center for Operator Performance



An Industry-Academia Collaboration www.operatorperformance.org



